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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market,
in a country undergoing a transitional period.
Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed
Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’
composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt.
Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership
and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms
with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of
dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or
ratios.
Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling
model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership
and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher
dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.
Keywords Egypt, Corporate governance, Corporate ownership, Dividends, Emerging markets
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
An important body of literature examined dividend policies in developed capital
markets – mainly the USA (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook,
1984). However, relatively few empirical studies have addressed the determinants of
dividends in emerging capital markets (Smith and Watts, 1992; Adaoglu, 2000). An
increasing volume of literature (Glen et al., 1995; Adaoglu, 2000) is suggesting
significant differences in dividend policy behaviour between developed countries and
developing countries.
Several theoretical models are used to explain corporate dividend policy. Signalling
models are based on the assumption that managers have more information about the
firm’s future cash flows than do individuals outside the firm, and they have incentives
to signal that information to investors (Gugler, 2003). Unexpected changes in dividend
policy are used to mitigate information asymmetries between managers and owners
(Frankfurter and Wood Jr., 2002). The Agency model uses dividend policy to better
align the interests of shareholders and corporate managers. The free cash flow model is
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0307-4358.htm
MF
34,12
954
based on the assumption that the payment of dividends can decrease the level of funds
that managers can use at their discretion (Jensen, 1986). The current study tests the
applicability of these models to the emerging capital market of Egypt.
The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of both board of directors’
characteristics and ownership structure, on corporate dividend policies of a sample of
top Egyptian listed companies. After a decade of an extensive privatization program, a
unique feature of the Egyptian stock exchange is that many listed companies have
varying ownership structure because many of them were formerly state-owned
enterprises, before being restructured and listed on the stock exchange for the purpose
of gradual privatization.
Testing the effect of ownership structure and board of directors’ composition on
firms’ dividend policies in an emerging capital market is a useful contribution to the
literature since little evidence currently exists on emerging capital markets.
This study provides evidence from the Egyptian Capital Market (Cairo and
Alexandria Stock Exchanges: CASE), a recently revitalized emerging capital market
after 30 years of inactivity and illiquidity during the socialist era.
The questions addressed in the paper are:
(1) Is there a significant association between corporate dividend decisions of the 50
most active companies in the CASE (CASE 50) and the composition of their
board of directors?
(2) Is there a significant association between corporate dividend payout ratios of
CASE 50 and the composition of their board of directors?
(3) Is there a significant association between corporate dividend decisions of CASE
50 and their ownership structure?
(4) Is there a significant association between corporate dividend payout ratios of
CASE 50 and their ownership structure?
(5) To what extent does the empirical evidence support the applicability of various
dividend theories in explaining corporate dividend policies in an emerging
capital market, in a country in transition?
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 includes an overview of the
Egyptian stock exchange followed by ownership structure in Egypt in section 3.
Section 4 presents for hypotheses development and offers an explanation of the
relationship between board of directors’ composition, ownership structure and
dividend policy. Section 5 provides a discussion of the variables tested, model
development and sample. Section 6 presents a discussion and summary of the findings.
Section 7 concludes the study.
2. The Egyptian stock exchange
Egypt has a developing economy whose stock exchange dates from 1882. This
exchange grew until it was considered the fifth most active market in the world in the
1950s (ACCE, 1995). In the late 1950s, there began a process of nationalization in
various economic sectors which led to a socialist era. As a result, the activities of the
stock exchange decreased dramatically. Thereafter, the stock exchange remained
inactive for 30 years. In the early 1990s, as part of its privatization programme
agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, the Egyptian government decided to
revitalize its capital market by improving its reputation and the confidence of
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investors. The principal method utilized to activate the stock market was via public
offerings of state-owned enterprises. According to the Ministry of Public Enterprise,
since the advent of the program in 1994 and up until the end of June 2003,
approximately 62 per cent of the original portfolio has been privatized. The sales
proceeds from these companies stood at LE 16.6 billion, as of June 2003 (Berg and
Capaul, 2004).
The CASE broke new records in 2005, outperforming both developed and emerging
markets as per Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley indices. CASE was considered
by Newsweek magazine as one of the ten best stock markets in the world in 2005
(AMCHAM, 2006). Trading indicators during the year showed record-breaking levels,
with trading figures reaching LE 2 billion by the end of 2005. At the end of September
2005, there were 765 CASE-listed companies. During the same period, market
capitalisation more than tripled to US$ 67 billion, from US$ 21 billion. Investors mainly
invested in the 50 most liquid companies listed on the exchange (CASE 50), which
accounted for 80 per cent of the trading volume in 2005 (Kelly, 2006). In June 2008,
CASE has been renamed the ‘‘Egyptian stock exchange’’.
Concerning taxation of dividend in Egypt, in the case of individuals, mutual funds
and international funds, no taxes are levied on dividends, capital gain and interest on
bonds. Furthermore, the corporate tax law abolished the capital gains tax levied on the
Egyptian corporate entities that were previously subject to such taxes.
3. Ownership structure in Egypt
Egyptian companies have one tier boards comprised of an odd number of members,
with a minimum of three. The board of directors of a joint stock company should
include a majority of non-executive members with an appropriate mix of skills,
technical, or analytical experience (Bahaa El Din and Shawky, 2005). For the current
sample; CASE 50, the independence ratios ranged from 20 to 90 per cent. Frequently,
the board’s chairman or the managing director (or Chief Executive Officer (CEO)) is
the same person. For the current sample; CASE 50, on average, 48 per cent of the
companies have a chairman with dual role. According to the legislative and regulatory
framework, the Annual General Meeting (AGM), board of directors, internal and
external auditors, and government authorities monitor management. The board of
directors is the ultimate body governing the corporation and responsible for
monitoring the implementation of the company’s objectives set by the AGM. In
companies with more than 25 per cent state ownership, the Central Agency for
Accounting audits the company. The board is accountable vis-a`-vis shareholders and
the company, and is liable for any misrepresentation or falsification. The Capital
Market Authority (CMA) requests companies to submit annually a list of the names,
nationalities and other pertinent details of board members and senior management.
CMAmust be immediately notified of any change (Bahaa El Din and Shawky, 2005).
One of the main features of the ownership structure in Egypt involves considerable
controlling stakes of some families, financial and industrial institutions, and the
government. For the current sample; CASE 50, the average individual shareholding
ranged from 0 to 42 per cent, institutional shareholding ranged from 0 to 91 per cent
and governmental shareholding ranged from 0 to 92 per cent.
Concerning ownership disclosure, companies should make available an updated
shareholder list at the AGM, but not to the level of ultimate beneficial ownership and
not in the annual report, according to Egyptian regulations. Shareholders have the
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right to inspect the minutes of the AGM, which include an attachment containing the
names of all registered owners and the amount of shares held by each. CASE recently
started to request that CASE 50 companies disclose their ownership structure of 5 per
cent or more to CASE. However this is not mandatory by law or by current regulations.
The new Capital Market Law as well as the new listing requirements seek to reinforce
ownership disclosure (Fawzy, 2003).
4. Hypotheses development
4.1 Board composition
Corporate boards play an important role in monitoring and disciplining management.
Independent directors are desirable because of their breadth of knowledge and
experience, as well as their independence from corporate management (Farinha, 2003).
Fama (1980) argues that the viability of the board might be enhanced by the inclusion
of outside directors (Ghosh, 2006) and the separation between the roles of chairman
and CEO.
Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend policy is a mechanism to reduce agency costs. In
the absence of any other monitoring, shareholders would need the agency monitoring
element of dividend policy. On the other hand, independent non-executive directors
may act as a monitoring device on the firm’s managers, thus dampening in principle,
the need for higher dividend payouts. If independent directors are an effective
monitoring device, then board independence and dividend policy should be substitutes
in the monitoring of agency problems. However, if the monitoring of outside directors
is insufficient, it is possible that NEDs may influence higher dividend payouts by a
company, to enhance managerial monitoring by external capital markets (Farinha,
2003).
There are two competing views in the literature about the effect of board size. One
view is that large boards allow directors to specialise. Greater specialisation can lead to
more effective monitoring (Klein, 2002), and hence lower dividends are needed for the
monitoring role. The other view is that large boards are less effective than small boards
due to the difficulties of coordinating large groups (Jensen, 1993).
In this study, three board characteristics are tested. These are board independence
(Fama, 1980; Farinha, 2003), dual role and board size. From the above discussion, the
following hypothesis is formed as follows:
H1. Dividend policy (dividend decision and ratio) of top Egyptian listed companies
is significantly associated with board of directors’ composition.
4.2 Ownership structure
Distribution of stock among shareholders has a significant impact on corporate actions
that are dependent on shareholder voting. Majority control gives the larger
shareholders considerable power and discretion over key decisions, like dividends’
decisions and payout ratios (Gugler, 2003). Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends
play a role in controlling equity agency problems, by facilitating primary capital
market monitoring of the firm’s activities and performance (Farinha, 2003).
Agency theory suggests that outside shareholders have a preference for dividends
over retained earnings, because insiders might misuse cash retained within the firm
(see, e.g. Easterbrook, 1984; Jenson, 1986; Myers, 2000). This preference for dividends
may be even stronger in emerging markets with weak investor protection, if
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shareholders perceive a greater risk of expropriation by insiders in such countries
(Mitton, 2004).
In the presence of other monitoring mechanisms such as large institutional
blockholders, dividends are likely to play a lesser role in resolving agency costs
(Easterbrook, 1984). However, it is possible that institutions may influence higher
dividend payouts by a company, to enhance managerial monitoring by external capital
markets, especially if they believe their own direct monitoring efforts to be insufficient
or too costly (Farinha, 2003). Since government ownership is a form of, or at least
similar to, institutional ownership, it is likely that the arguments above may also apply
(Gul, 1999b). The expected sign for this coefficient may be either positive or negative.
Managerial share ownership aligns the interests of managers with those of
shareholders, as managers are less likely to engage in actions which are not in the
interest of shareholders. In addition, Easterbrook (1984) emphasized that in the
presence of other monitoring mechanisms, such as a large blockholder, dividends are
likely to play a lesser role in resolving agency costs (Filbeck, 1999). However, empirical
testing of this proposition has produced mixed results (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick,
1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). From the above arguments, the following
hypothesis is formed:
H2. Dividend policy (dividend decision and ratio) of top Egyptian listed companies
is significantly associated with ownership structure.
5. Methodology and data sources
This section explains variables tested, sample and model development.
5.1 Model
The dividend policy is represented by two variables. The first is dividend decisions of
companies, which is the prediction of the model concerning whether a company
chooses to pay dividends or not. The variable DIVDECISION is a dummy variable,
therefore, set to one if the company paid dividends. The second variable is the amount
of dividend paid (DIVRATIO), which is defined in terms of dividend yield (dividend per
share/market price per share) (Redding, 1997). Board of directors’ composition is
measured by three variables: board size (BOARDSIZE), board independence
(INDEPENDENCE) and dual role (DUALROLE). Board size is measured as the total
number of directors sitting on the board. Board independence is measured as the ratio
of independent members to the total number of directors. Ownership structure is
measured by four variables: managerial ownership ratio, blockholder ownership ratio,
institutional ownership ratio and free float ratio.
Profitability is included as a control variable since a firm’s recent accounting
performance may be correlated with its growth opportunities (Skinner, 1993), and
firms with higher profits are able to pay higher dividends and signal their performance
(Miller and Rock, 1985; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Gul, 1999a). Price earnings and return
on equity ratios are tested as measures of performance.
To provide empirical testing to the hypotheses addressed in the study, the following
two models are constructed:
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DIVDECISION ¼ 0 þ 1INDEPENDENCE
þ 2DUALROLE
þ 3BOARDSIZEþ 4MANOWN
þ 5BLOCKOWNþ 6INSTOWN
þ 7FREEFLOAT
þ 8ROEþ 9EPSþ 
ð1Þ
DIVRATIO ¼ 0 þ 1INDEPENDENCE
þ 2DUALROLEþ 3BOARDSIZE
þ 4MANOWN
þ 5BLOCKOWN
þ 6INSTOWN
þ 7FREEFLOAT
þ 8ROEþ 9EPSþ 
ð2Þ
where DIVDECISION, dividend decision; DIVRATIO, dividend yield;
INDEPENDENCE, ratio of independent directors; DUALROLE, dual role;
BOARDSIZE, board size; MANOWN, ratio of directors’ ownership; BLOCKOWN, ratio
of block ownership; INSTOWN, ratio of institutional ownership; FREEFLOAT,
percentage of shares held by outsiders; ROE, return on equity; EPS, earnings per share.
5.2 Sample and data sources
The study covers the 50 most active companies in the egyptian stock exchange (CASE
50) for the years 2003-2005. These companies accounted for almost 80 per cent of the
trading volume for stocks in the Egyptian stock exchange in 2005. The data for the
three years is then pooled to obtain 150 observations for each variable. The main
advantage of pooling is that it is possible to increase the number of observations,
especially in cases where each individual cross-section sample is so small in size that it
could affect the degrees of freedom adversely (Adaoglu, 2000).
Table I presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analyses. The average dividend ratio for CASE 50 firms for the years 2003-2005 is 4.3
Table I.
Descriptive statistics of
the study variables
Variables Mean
Dividend yield (%) 4.34
Independence ratio 0.55
Board size 19.00
Managerial ownership ratio (%) 6.51
Individuals’ block ownership ratio (%) 2.27
Institutional ownership (non-governmental) (%) 19.43
Governmental ownership ratio (%) 29.97
Return on equity (%) 15.73
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per cent, ranging from 0 to 100.2 per cent. For CASE 50 firms, 48 per cent have a
chairman with dual role. The average size of the board of directors of CASE 50
companies is 19 members, ranging from a minimum of five members to a maximum of
44. The average independence ratio of the boards is 55 per cent, ranging from a
minimum of 20 per cent, and a maximum of 90 per cent. The average of return on
equity ratio is 15 per cent, ranging from a minimum of98.6 per cent to a maximum of
75.2 per cent. The averages of share ownership by top management, individuals,
government and institutions, are 6.5, 2.27, 30 and 19 per cent, respectively. The average
free float (external ownership) is 50 per cent, which reflects the transitional stage of the
emerging market of Egypt.
6. Results and discussion
The Pearson’s correlation matrix (Table II) shows that the degree of correlation
between the independent variables is either low or moderate, which suggests the
absence of multicollinearity between independent variables. As suggested by Bryman
and Cramer (1997), the Pearson’s r between each pair of independent variables should
not exceed 0.80; otherwise, independent variables with a coefficient in excess of 0.80
may be suspected of exhibiting multicollinearity. Correlations coefficients in the
sample are within an acceptable range (0.01-0.53). In addition, the collinearity
diagnostic statistics (e.g. tolerance (TOL) and variance inflated factor (VIF) and
condition index (CI)) support the Pearson’s correlation coefficients and provide no proof
of a multicollinearity problem in the regression model. The tests for the serial
correlation of the residuals are well specified in terms of serially uncorrelated residuals,
and support the null hypothesis, i.e. there is no serial correlation of the error terms, and
overall, the results are valid with 95 per cent confidence[1].
Table III presents the regression analysis of the dividend payout decision, using
binary logistic procedure. The explanatory power of the model is 0.26. The results
show that dividend payout decision is positively associated with institutional non-
governmental (sig¼ 0.04) ownership. Firm performance represented by return on
equity was also a significant variable with a positive sign, but at sig¼ 0.09. Companies
with higher return on equity and higher institutional non-governmental ownership
were more likely to take a decision of distributing dividends. No significant association
was found between board composition and dividend decisions.
Table IV presents the analysis of the dividend payout ratio (adj R2¼ 0.22). The
results show that dividend payout ratio is also positively associated with institutional
non-governmental ownership (sig¼ 0.01) and firm performance (return on equity)
(sig¼ 0.00). No significant association was found between board size or independence,
and dividend payout ratio. For a sample of top 50 Egyptian listed companies, the more
profitable firms with higher percentage of institutional ownership decided to pay
dividends at the highest ratios. One explanation could be that more profitable firms
distributed more dividends to signal to the market their higher quality, especially in an
emerging market in a transitional period, in which companies are competing for
external capital (Gul, 1999b; Adaoglu, 2000). The empirical results support H2 and
confirm the association between ownership structure and dividend policies in Egypt.
Another explanation is that the institutional blockholders voted for higher payout
ratios to enhance managerial monitoring by external capital markets (Farinha, 2003).
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Table II.
Correlation coefficients
of the variables used in
the study
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7. Conclusion
This study provides insight into the dividend policies by top Egyptian-listed
companies. We additionally extend the current literature linking governance factors
and dividend policies to specifically address an emerging capital market in a country
undergoing a privatization program. Prior work in this area has primarily focused on
developed capital markets.
This research explored the applicability of established dividend models on an
emerging capital market in a country undergoing a transitional period. Strong support
was found for the signalling model, from the significant association between dividend
and firm performance. Partial support was obtained for agency theory, from the
significant positive association between dividend and institutional ownership. In the
emerging market of Egypt, top performing Egyptian listed companies with higher
Table III.
Regression results of
dividend decision
B SE Wald df Significance Exp (B)
INDEPENDENCE 0.494 0.353 1.959 1 0.162 0.610
BOARDSIZE 0.287 0.288 0.993 1 0.319 0.751
MANOWN 0.804 0.520 2.390 1 0.122 2.235
BLOCKOWN 0.162 0.335 0.233 1 0.629 0.851
GOVOWN 0.837 0.440 3.618 1 0.057 2.310
INSTOWN 1.046 0.509 4.216 1 0.040 2.846
FREEFLOAT 0.248 0.363 0.467 1 0.495 1.281
ROE 0.528 0.313 2.854 1 0.091 1.696
PE ratio 0.278 0.282 0.975 1 0.323 0.757
Notes: INDEPENDENCE, ratio of independent directors; BOARDSIZE, board size; MANOWN,
ratio of directors’ ownership; BLOCKOWN, ratio of block ownership; INSTOWN, ratio of
institutional ownership; GOVOWN, government ownership; FREEFLOAT, percentage of shares
held by outsiders; ROE, return on equity; PE RATIO, price earnings ratio
Table IV.
Regression results of
dividend ratio
Coefficients t-value Significance
INDEPENDENCE 0.127 1.191 0.238
DUALROLE 0.082 0.678 0.500
BOARDSIZE 0.043 0.376 0.708
DUALROLE 0.017 0.143 0.887
MANOWN 0.108 0.999 0.322
BLOCKOWN 0.073 0.682 0.497
INSTOWN 0.270 2.561 0.013
FREEFLOAT 0.121 1.119 0.267
ROE 0.407 3.862 0.000
PE RATIO 0.008 0.079 0.938
Adjusted R2 0.224
F 11.080
Significance 0.000
Notes: INDEPENDENCE, ratio of independent directors; DUALROLE, dual role; BOARDSIZE,
board size; MANOWN, ratio of directors’ ownership; BLOCKOWN, ratio of block ownership;
INSTOWN, ratio of institutional ownership; FREEFLOAT, percentage of shares held by outsiders;
ROE, return on equity; PE RATIO, price earnings ratio
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block institutional ownership, which implies lower agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984),
paid higher dividends to attract capital during the transitional period of Egypt.
Our research suffers from some limitations. The sample of top fifty companies was
selected because investors mainly invested in the 50 most liquid companies listed on
the exchange (CASE 50), which accounted for 80 per cent of the trading volume in 2005.
Despite these limitations, the current study provides a contribution to understanding
dividend policies of companies listed on the Egyptian stock exchange, and is especially
relevant given recent changes in the institutional environment inwhich Egyptian-listed
companies operate. Our study provides a springboard for future research in the area of
dividend policies in emerging capital markets.
Note
1. Hair et al. (1998), Studenmund (2001) and Gujarati (2003) argue that the VIF, TOL and CI
are accepted measures of multicollinearity. Bowerman and O’Connell (1990) and Myers
(1990) suggest that if the largest VIF value is greater than 10, then there is cause for
concern over multicollinearity. However, Studenmund (2001) states that if the VIF value
is greater than 5, this could be an indication of a multicollinearity problem. Menard
(1995) mentions that TOL below 0.2 indicates a potential multicollinearity problem. The
CI is used along with the regression coefficient variance-decomposition matrix. This
matrix shows the proportion of variance for each regression coefficient (and its
associated variable) attributable to each condition index. To determine if there is
collinearity, the condition indices over a threshold value (typically 15) must be
determined. Belsley et al. (1980) claim that a CI greater than 15 indicates a possible
problem and if it is more than 30, it is an indicator of a serious problem with collinearity.
In this study, the multicollinearity diagnostic is undertaken using different measures
and the results reveal that multicollinearity is not a serious problem since all the
reported VIFs are less than three, TOLs are over 0.2 and CIs are around 15. The tests of
multicollinearity and serial correlation are available from the authors upon request.
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